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Abstract 
CEO incentive contracts are commonplace in China but their incidence varies significantly 
across Chinese cities. We show that city and provincial policy experiments help explain this 
variance. We examine the role of two policy experiments: the use of Special Economic Zones 
(SEZs) to attract foreign direct investment (FDI), and the rate at which state owned 
enterprises (SOEs) were privatised. CEO incentive contracts are negatively correlated with 
foreign ownership and with the introduction of FDI via SEZs. However, the SEZ effect 
disappears having accounted for the city-level composition of firms and executives.  Rapid 
SOE privatisation is associated with higher city and firm-level adoption of CEO incentive 
contracts, irrespective of the firm's own current ownership status. The positive effect of 
privatisation is robust to various estimation techniques and model specifications. 
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1. Introduction 
 
A well-functioning market for corporate executives first emerged in China in the 1980s, 
prompted by state experimentation with an array of managerial incentives to accompany the 
gradual withdrawal of the state from its ownership of corporate enterprises (Xu, 2011). 
According to Groves et al. (1995: 874) the state introduced reforms "directed at improving 
the efficiency of enterprises by replacing direct control from above with managerial 
incentives". This entailed the gradual commercialisation of state owned enterprises (SOE's) 
and their part privatisation, with key innovations including multi-year managerial contracts 
and experimentation with the auctioning of managerial contracts. By the late 1980s, this 
market for corporate executives seemed quite well-established but early evidence was 
confined to executives in the SOE's sector. More recent studies are dominated by analyses of 
the relatively new and rapidly growing public listed sector, much of which remains in state 
ownership. Although important economically (Bryson et al., 2012a), the public listed sector 
accounts for a relatively small proportion of all firms and all CEO's, so the picture it paints of 
executive compensation is necessarily partial. Furthermore, both literatures on SOE's and 
public listed firms have largely ignored one crucial feature of China's efforts to foster a 
market-oriented economy, namely the fact that most initiatives were undertaken at local level, 
often by city authorities in a series of local experiments. Central government endorsement of 
such activities often came after-the-fact or not at all (Xu, 2011: 1124-1125).  
 
We fill this gap in the existing literature by exploring the importance of city-level influences 
on firms' use of incentive contracts for CEO's in the early part of the 21st Century. We focus 
on two sorts of "marketisation" programme: privatisation of SOE's; and efforts to attract 
foreign direct investment (FDI) via Special Economic Zones (SEZ's). If SOE privatisation 
was a major force behind the introduction of incentive contracts, as the earlier literature 
indicates, and if this managerial practice was viewed favourably by enterprises outside the 
state sector, we would expect firms' adoption of incentive contracts in the present day to be 
greater in cities that promoted SOE privatisation early on. We know that SEZ's were very 
successful in attracting FDI (Wang, 2013), such that by 2005 China was the third largest 
recipient of FDI funds in the world.
1
 However, there is very little evidence on the use of 
executive incentive contracts among foreign firms entering China, so it is uncertain what 
impact this may have had on the promotion of CEO incentive contracts in those areas with 
early adoption of SEZ's. 
 
Our empirical analysis uses the World Bank's Enterprise Survey 2005 which sampled 12,400 
enterprises in 120 Chinese cities two decades after the initial market-inspired reforms. We 
find incentive contracts are commonplace but that their incidence varies significantly across 
Chinese cities. We find the use of CEO incentive contracts in 2005 is positively correlated 
with the speed with which cities privatised their SOEs, irrespective of the degree of current 
state ownership in the firm, confirming the conjecture that cities which experimented early on 
with privatisation created an environment in which local firms were encouraged to adopt this 
new form of managerial practice. The finding is robust to controlling for a wide range of 
CEO and firm characteristics at both individual firm and city level, and to the use of a two-
step estimation procedure in which we regress city coefficients from a first stage incentive 
contracts regression on city-level regressors. 
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Foreign-owned firms often innovate as they seek a comparative advantage over local 
producers to help recoup some of the costs associated with transferring operations abroad. 
Incentive contracts for CEO's may have been one such innovation. However, we find the 
probability that a firm adopts an incentive contract for its CEO is negatively associated with 
the early introduction of FDI via SEZ's and with the proportion of foreign-owned firms in the 
city, regardless of the firm's own ownership status. These findings suggest that the network of 
firms through which CEO incentive contracts diffused consisted largely of domestic firms 
and that high concentrations of foreign ownership militated against the use of CEO incentive 
contracts. We will provide evidence to suggest that this is because foreign-owned firms 
preferred to use efficiency wages to incentivise workers, paying them above the market-rate, 
rather than via incentive contracts. However, the negative association between early SEZ 
introduction and CEO incentive contracts in 2005 is not robust to the inclusion of city-level 
controls for firm and CEO composition. The implication is that speed with which SEZ's were 
adopted was driven, in part, by city characteristics and that it was these, rather than SEZ's per 
se, which influenced firms' propensity to adopt incentive contracts for their CEO's. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section Two we provide some 
background on the nature of the corporate sector in China and the role of incentive contracts. 
In Section Three we discuss China's efforts to create a market-oriented economy and the role 
of cities in the diffusion of incentive contracts for executives. In Section Four we present our 
data and estimation approach. In Section Five we present our results and Section Six 
concludes. 
 
 
2. Principals, Agents and CEO Incentives in China 
 
The standard principal-agent problem described in the CEO compensation literature assumes 
CEO's are recruited to maximise shareholder value by raising the profitability of the firm but 
that, in the absence of perfect monitoring, CEO's may invest time in improving their own 
future career prospects, perhaps to the detriment of the firm (Holmström and Milgrom, 1991). 
Shareholders therefore use cash and equity-based incentive mechanisms, and the threat of 
dismissal, to hold CEO's accountable.  
 
The existing empirical evidence on the use of incentive mechanisms is heavily based on 
studies for the United States and other Western economies. The Chinese setting is different in 
two fundamental ways. First, ownership is more concentrated than in the West: two-thirds 
(68%) of firms in the World Bank 2005 survey had a single owner. This increases both the 
incentive and, arguably, the ability of the owner to monitor top executives' behaviour and 
performance relative to the scenario in which the CEO is accountable to multiple owners. 
Second, the state and economic activity are inextricably linked in China. The state owns a 
substantial part of the corporate sector in China. Despite divesting itself of many previously 
state owned enterprises and reducing its stake in publicly listed firms,  the state continued to 
have a majority stake in over two-fifths (45%) of publicly listed firms in 2010, and these 
accounted for three-quarters (73%) of the employment in the sector and four-fifths (82%) of 
its output (Bryson et al., 2012a).  
 
State ownership is much less common in the economy as a whole. As Table 1 shows, in 2005 
the state only had an ownership stake in one-fifth of firms and majority ownership in 13% of 
firms. Half (51%) of all firms had some private domestic ownership and over one-third (36%) 
of firms were majority privately owned. One-fifth of firms have some foreign ownership 
 3 
stake and 14 percent are majority foreign owned.
2
 The picture that emerges is a far more 
mixed economy than the one portrayed in the literatures which focus on SOE's and the public 
listed sector in China. 
 
The state plays a direct role in the appointment and dismissal of CEO's in firms that are 
government-owned, and may indirectly influence corporate decision-making because of the 
role that political advancement plays in the CEO labour market (Bryson et al., 2012b; Cao et 
al., 2012). If China's CEO's were simply bureaucrats, paid to perform tasks required by the 
state, one might expect their behaviours to be governed by procedures laid down by the state, 
in which case they would have little of the operational autonomy which one normally 
associates with the position of CEO, and there would be little reason to offer them incentive 
contracts. In fact, Bryson et al. (2012b) find CEO's have substantial autonomy over decisions 
relating to production, investment and employment, which means that firms' owners will be 
concerned to align CEO's interests with those of the firm. We find that two-thirds (67%) of 
firms did so by linking their CEO's annual income directly to the company's performance 
(Table 2). What is more, in one-quarter (23%) of firms these were "high powered" incentives 
in the sense that more than 10% of the CEO's annual income depended on whether or not the 
company's performance hit the agreed target. These contracts were common across all 
ownership types, though they were less common in foreign-owned firms than elsewhere. The 
median elasticity of pay with respect to company performance was 1.
3
  
 
 
3. The Adoption of CEO Incentive Contracts and the Role of City 
Experimentation 
 
In the recent theoretical literature incentive contracts have been treated as a form of 
technology deployed by firms to improve their good management (Bloom and Van Reenen, 
2011). As such, their adoption is governed by cost and benefit considerations similar to those 
involved in other new technologies (Ichniowski and Shaw, 1995). Their diffusion – as with 
other technologies relating to employment practices which have an experiential component – 
is often dependent upon local networks of firms that share their experiences regarding the 
costs and benefits of innovations (Bryson et al., 2007). Where there are performance benefits 
of the new technology there are first mover advantages to early adopters and isomorphic 
pressures to adopt for followers, such as those described by DiMaggio and Powell (1983). If 
one conceives of CEO incentive contracts in this fashion, one might anticipate that the 
probability of a firm adopting incentive contracts for CEO’s will partly depend upon the take-
up of incentive contracts among other firms in the locale. We hypothesise that city location 
will explain some of the variance in CEO incentives in China, independent of the 
characteristics of firms, the product market in which they are operating, their governance 
structures and the characteristics of their executives. 
 
                                                 
2
 In addition to the ownership stakes presented in Table 1 the 2005 survey contains the registration status of the 
company. Only 9 percent of the surveyed firms were registered as SOE's. Half (50%) were registered as limited 
liability shareholding firms, 14% were registered as privately domestically owned, and one-fifth (19%) were 
registered as foreign-owned. 
3
 Respondents were asked how much the CEO's income would increase if the performance measure increased by 
1%. They were asked this for the first and second most important measures of performance used to make the 
decision. They were also asked the same question in relation to decreases in performance. Thus there are four 
questions asked. In each case the median elasticity of pay to performance was 1.0. 
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However, there is an additional reason to suppose that there will be a strong geographical 
component to the variance in incentive contract adoption by firms in China. This is the local 
nature of experiments with market mechanisms in China. The transition to a market economy 
in China is unique among Communist and post-Communist regimes. It is characterised by 
what Xu (2011: 1078) describes as "regionally decentralized authoritarianism", a regime 
under which the central state government provides the political impetus for change, retains 
central control of personnel decisions and thus the careers of all officials, but cedes 
responsibility for initiatives and experimentation to sub-national governments. As Xu (2011: 
1079) notes: "One of the most important initiatives taken by many sub-national governments 
was the development of non-state firms, including FDI and indigenous firms". The 
emergence of these two types of non-state firms - foreign-owned and indigenous firms - were 
promoted by two, quite separate processes and initiatives, both of which may be linked to the 
diffusion of CEO incentive contracts.  
 
The first of these initiatives was the reform of SOE's and their part privatisation. Whereas in 
most transition economies SOE's were owned by central government, in China many were 
owned by sub-national governments. The importance of SOE's to regional economies meant 
that local officials' career advancement during the reform period depended heavily on 
improving the productivity and financial performance of SOE's. The first wave of SOE 
reforms in the 1980s involved the introduction of management selection by competitive 
auction, and the introduction of incentive contracts for CEO's (Groves et al., 1994, 1995). 
According to Xu (2011: 1120): "In response to regional competition, also under the 
encouragement of the central government's reform guidelines, sub-national governments 
experimented with various 'managerial responsibility systems' in which managers were 
delegated power to make many decisions, and employees were given financial incentives tied 
to enterprise performance". The reforms achieved their goals in improving factor allocation 
and raising productivity (Jefferson et al., 2006). However, burgeoning debt in the SOE sector 
led to a second wave of SOE reforms in the 1990s which entailed hardening budget 
constraints through bankruptcy reforms, reducing labour costs through layoffs, and selling 
loss-making enterprises to private owners (Xu, 2011: 1121-1126).  
 
As Xu (2011: 1124-1125) notes, privatisation was not encouraged by central government 
until the late 1990s so that "de facto privatisation was tried quietly without official 
permission from central government...Even in the late 1990s, it was still a city government's 
decision whether or not to privatise and how to privatise within their jurisdictions". Thus the 
rate of privatisation was driven largely by municipal governments' preferences. We are able 
to track the rate of privatisation in Chinese provinces by measuring the change in the share of 
employment accounted for by SOE's. Over the period 1978 to 2005 the share of urban 
employment accounted for by SOE's  fell from a median of 77 percent to 27 percent 
(Appendix Table A2). The initial SOE employment shares varied somewhat by province, but 
the coefficient of variation grew over time due to differential rates at which provinces chose 
to privatise SOEs.
4
 
 
The privatisation process thus became a mechanism by which CEO incentive contracts were 
introduced to the private sector. There were two potential routes. First, around half of 
privatised firms were sold to managers through management buy-outs (Gan et al., 2010), so 
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 Based on the figures in Appendix Table A2 the coefficient of variation across provinces in the employment 
share accounted for by SOE's was 0.10 but this had grown to 0.39 in 2005. The inter-quartile range rose from 
0.11 to 0.21. The provinces experiencing the most far-reaching privatisation processes were Jiangsu followed by 
Zhejiang and Shandong.  Those experiencing the least amount of privatisation were Shanxi and Nei Mongol.  
 5 
that managers previously working under incentive contracts in the state sector were now 
doing so in the private sector. Second, if privatised firms were the first movers in adopting 
incentive contracts, their growth and the seeming importance of these new managerial 
practices to their success may have exerted increasing pressure on existing private firms to 
follow, as predicted under technological diffusion models. 
 
The second reform initiative is the Special Economic Zones (SEZs), sometimes known as 
development zones, introduced to attract FDI and develop export-oriented industries. The 
number of SEZ's increased from 4 in 1980 to 342 in 2005.
5
  Their share of total Chinese FDI 
rose from 35 percent to 94 percent and their share of total Chinese exports rose from less than 
2 percent to 93 percent (Xu, 2011: 1114). Thus, rather than altering the orientation of existing 
indigenous firms towards production and management practices, SEZ's were concerned to 
attract newcomers from abroad, and start-ups with substantial foreign backing. Our data in 
Appendix Table A2 indicate that by 2010 118 of our 120 cities had an SEZ. Of these, 65 
attained SEZ status in 1992 or 1993. Early SEZ experiments were often trials supported by 
central government, although sometimes after considerable delay (as indicated by the fact 
that the date for city SEZ adoption is often much earlier than the date for national-level 
acknowledgement).  
 
Although, as Xu (2011: 1114) points out, "a major part of the experiment involved trying new 
sets of institutions, legislation, and rules for the purpose of attracting FDI", a priori, it is 
uncertain as to whether SEZ's might attract firms with high or low propensities to offer their 
executives incentive contracts. The industrial organisation literature suggests foreign-based 
firms are often first-movers in the adoption of new technologies as they seek a comparative 
advantage over local producers that will help recoup some of the costs associated with 
transferring production abroad (Te Velde, 2003). As noted above, incentive contracts for 
executives might be seen as one such technology, that is, an innovation in personnel 
management resulting in performance gains to the firm that may have been absent without the 
deployment of incentive contracts. A second reason for anticipating a positive association 
between incentive contracts and the advent of SEZ's is that foreign-owned firms are likely to 
deploy incentive contracts in their firms elsewhere in the world (Caves, 1996). If they simply 
transfer those practices to their operations in China, this could result in an influx of firms 
using incentive contracts for CEO's. On the other hand, there can be advantages to firms in 
adapting their policies to the standard or dominant modus operandi when they make foreign 
investments.
6
 This may occur if firms face disproportionate costs in introducing the practices 
they use elsewhere, or if the host country permits less costly practices than those the firm is 
required to adopt elsewhere. It is also possible that foreign-owned firms will eschew 
incentives contracts if they are able to out-bid domestic rivals for the best executive talent by 
paying above market rates. There is evidence that foreign owned firms were paying higher 
wages to workers than their domestic counterparts in the early 2000s (Zhou et al., 2010). 
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 They were originally the brainchild of Xi Zhongxun, governor of Guangdong province, in 1979.  Following 
their success Xi became Vice Chairman of the National People's Congress, clearly illustrating the link between 
pioneering local reforms and career success. 
6
 This appears to be the policy of Walmart with respect to trade unions.  They vehemently oppose union 
organisation at home in the United States, but are prepared to countenance unionisation in counties where it is 
common in the retail sector.  See http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/wal-mart-works-with-
unions-abroad-but-not-at-home/2011/06/07/AG0nOPLH_story.html 
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4. Data and Estimation 
 
We investigate the hypotheses outlined above using data from the 2005 World Bank 
Investment Climate Survey undertaken by the National Bureau of Statistics in China 
(www.enterprisesurveys.org). It covers 12,400 firms located in 120 cities throughout China. 
One hundred firms were surveyed in each city except in the four largest cities (Shanghai, 
Tianjin, Beijing and Chongqing) where 200 were surveyed. All provincial capitals were 
sampled together with cities selected based on the economic size of the province. Firms were 
randomly selected within the ten largest industries in each province (by value added). 
Consequently, the survey covers all major cities and is broadly representative of industrial 
economic activity in China as a whole. Appendix Table A1 provides descriptive information 
on the data used in the analysis. 
 
We link information on privatisation and the introduction of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) 
to the World Bank data by matching information from external sources to the city and 
province identifiers in the World Bank data. These data are described in the Data Appendix 
and presented in Appendix Table A2.  
 
We use multivariate models to account for the variation in the use of incentive contracts for 
CEO's across firms.
7
 We focus on the role played by a firm's location and, in particular, its 
city and provincial location. If a firm's likelihood of using incentive contracts to reward 
CEO's is influenced by the behaviour of other firms in the vicinity we would expect to 
observe an association between location and incentive contracts. We also anticipate that the 
use of incentive contracts to reward CEO's will vary with firm characteristics (size, industry 
etc.), the firm's corporate governance arrangements, other policies used by the firm such as 
the threat of dismissal, and the characteristics of the CEO. These control variables are 
described in Appendix Table A1. 
 
Our chief interest is the role played by two local level policy experiments in influencing firm 
use of CEO incentive contracts. The first is privatisation, which we capture with the change 
in the percentage of all employment in a province accounted for by SOE employment 
between 1978 and 2005. In 1978 three-quarters (76%) of all provincial employment was 
accounted for by SOE's, a figure which had fallen by two-thirds to 29% in 2005. The second 
is the start up year for SEZ's which leads to an influx of FDI to the city. We observe the dates 
at which city-level SEZ's are officially sanctioned at city, province and national level (see the 
Data Appendix for further details). We identify early SEZ start ups as those receiving 
government endorsement between 1980 and 1991: these accounted for 23% of SEZ's 
obtaining city endorsement, 22% of those obtaining provincial endorsement and 18% of those 
obtaining national government endorsement.
 8
  
 
There are perhaps two major problems in identifying any causal relationship between local 
level policy experimentation and firm use of CEO incentive contracts. The first is that the 
policy experiments are not randomly assigned to cities: rather, whether and when a city 
adopts a policy of privatisation and/or SEZ adoption may depend, in part, on local conditions 
                                                 
7
 In the survey the term "General Manager" is used to identify the CEO, but throughout the paper we refer to this 
executive as the CEO.   
8
 As a sensitivity check we rerun all our analyses using Wang's (2013) data on start dates for SEZ's. We take the 
start date of the Enterprise Development Zone (EDZ) or Industrial Development Zone (IDZ), whichever is 
earliest, to denote the SEZ start date.  The results we present in the next section are not sensitive to the use of 
Wang's data. We report these alternative results when they are noteworthy. 
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in a city and perceptions as to whether the city would benefit from such an intervention. This 
is certainly the case with respect to early SEZ adoption since central government officials 
encouraging experimentation were cognizant of the need to identify locations which gave 
local experiments the best chance of success. The second problem is that firms' location 
decisions may be dependent, in part, on their expectations governing local environments, 
including whether they are subject to policy experiments such as SEZ's and privatisation. 
Thus firms may select into or out of cities partly in response to changing local policy 
environments, whereupon local variation in patterns of CEO incentive contracts may simply 
reflect those location decisions, rather than being driven by the sorts of technological 
diffusion mechanisms described earlier. Mindful of these difficulties we adopt three broad 
modelling strategies. Throughout we present linear estimates with standard errors clustered to 
account for city-level sampling. 
 
The first strategy is to run firm-level regressions that take the following form: 
 
1) iffifpcif XCEOCGPRIVSEZINCEN    
 
where INCENif is a dummy identifying contracts linking pay to performance for CEO i in 
firm f; SEZc is the year the city's SEZ was introduced (or in most of our specifications a 
dummy identifying early SEZ introduction); PRIVp is the change in the SOE employment 
share at provincial level between 1978 and 2005; CGf is a vector of corporate governance 
variables in firm f; CEOi are individual CEO demographic and job attributes; Xf are structural 
firm attributes; epsilon is the error term and the betas are coefficients to be estimated.
9
 In 
practice, the absence of panel data means that we observe only one CEO per firm and so the i 
and f  are non-separable.  
 
If the SEZ introduction and privatisation effects operate via encouragement of CEO incentive 
contracts at city-level, we would anticipate that mean take-up of CEO incentive contracts by 
firms other than the respondent in the city would be positively and significantly correlated 
with individual firm use of CEO incentive contracts and that the introduction of mean city-
level CEO incentive contracts as a control would lead to a reduction in the size of the SEZ 
and privatisation coefficients. We add mean city-level CEO incentive contracts to the right-
hand side of equation 1 to test for this. 
 
The second modelling strategy is to condition on city-level means of all right-hand side 
variables in addition to the controls in equation 1. In constructing the city mean variables we 
exclude the firm observation in question from the computation of the mean. The equation 
takes the following form: 
 
2) ficccfifpcif XCEOCGXCEOCGPRIVSEZINCEN    
 
In this model each firm-level covariate has a city-level analogue, as denoted by the subscript 
c.The value in conditioning on these city-level observable features of firms and their CEO's is 
that any association between our dependent variable - firm use of CEO incentive contracts - 
and the two policy variables (SEZ introduction and the rate of privatisation) is not 
confounded by other observable city features. Of course, because these city-level 
characteristics are measured at the end of the period (2005) they may partial out some of the 
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 See Appendix Table A1 for a full description of the variables appearing in each vector of controls. 
 8 
effects of the policy interventions that are due to CEO or firm selection. In addition the vector 
Xc includes city means for foreign ownership and state ownership of firms in 2005, both of 
which will be a function, at least in part, of the two policy interventions we are interested in. 
 
Even with this plethora of city-level controls we can not discount the possibility that any 
remaining association between our policy variables and a firm's use of CEO incentive 
contracts is being driven by unobserved features of the city. Our third modelling strategy 
therefore entails a two stage approach which seeks to tackle the omitted variables bias 
associated with the fixed unobservable characteristics of the cities in our sample. In the first 
stage we run a model similar to that presented in equation 2 with the firm-level CEO 
incentive dummy variable on the left-hand side and firm-level regressors on the right-hand 
side. But we replace the city-level covariates appearing in equation 2 with city dummy 
variables as denoted by cCITY in equation 3.1: 
 
3.1) fififcif XCEOCGCITYINCEN    
 
The city fixed effects coefficients (the  for each city) in equation 3.1 capture the fixed 
unobservable features of cities which affect the propensity of firms to adopt CEO incentive 
contracts, having accounted for the composition of firms and CEO's in the city.
10
 In the 
second stage we run a city-level regression in which the city fixed effect coefficients from 
equation 3.1 are regressed on the two policy variables and the city-level means for firm and 
CEO composition. The equation takes the following form: 
 
3.2)  ccccpcc XCEOCGPRIVSEZCITY    
 
We present results without and with bootstrapped standard errors to take account of the fact 
that the dependent variable is an estimated coefficient. Ideally we would want to account for 
the non-random timing of our policy interventions and firm sorting by location but data 
limitations mean we cannot account for firm-level unobservables nor time-varying factors at 
firm or city level which may bias our estimates.  
 
 
5. Results 
 
To illustrate the city clustering of CEO incentive contracts in China Figure 1 presents the city 
coefficients from a city fixed effects model estimating the likelihood that a firm uses an 
incentive contract to reward its CEO in 2005 relative to the reference city of Anqing in Anhui 
province. Darker shading represents larger positive coefficients. The city with firms least 
likely to deploy incentive contracts is Dongguan in Guangdong province, followed by two 
cities in Hebei province (Zhangjiakou and Qinhuangdao). The city with firms most likely to 
use incentive contracts is Hangzhou in Zhejiang province. Together the city dummies account 
for around 5 percent of the variance in firms' propensity to use incentive contracts.  
 
Figure 2 presents city coefficients again, but this time from a model as per equation 3.1 which 
controls for firm and CEO characteristics as presented in Appendix Table A1. This model 
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 Throughout we assume that the city (or province in the case of privatisation) is the level of spatial aggregation 
which is appropriate in capturing the effects of SEZ's and local decisions regarding SOE privatisation. In 
Gibbons and Overman's (2012) terminology firms within cities are allocated the same neighbourhood weight. 
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explains twice the variance in incentive contracts (10 percent as opposed to 5 percent for the 
raw city dummies model). However, the ranking of cities' coefficients is similar - the 
correlation coefficient is 0.92 - suggesting that the city-level effects are not driven by the 
composition of the firms or executives in the city.
11
 
 
Models (1) and (2) in Table 3 present the raw correlations between firm use of CEO incentive 
contracts and the two local policy experiments, namely the early introduction of a city SEZ 
and the rate of privatisation in the province to which the city belongs. Models (3) and (4) run 
the same analysis but incorporate firm-level controls, as presented in equation 1. Setting up 
an SEZ prior to 1992 is negatively associated with firm use of CEO incentive contracts in 
2005, but the effect is only on the margins of statistical significance without firm-level 
controls and becomes statistically non-significant once controls are introduced.
12
  
 
If we use the date at which the city SEZ obtained endorsement from the provincial 
government to construct the “early SEZ” dummy variable the coefficients are similar in size 
to those in Table 3 (-0.01) but are on the margins of statistical significance even when we 
introduce the firm-level controls. If we use the date at which the city SEZ obtained 
endorsement from the national government to construct the “early SEZ” dummy the 
coefficients and t-statistics are similar to those in Models (3) and (4).
13
 There is therefore 
only weak evidence of a link between early exposure to FDI via SEZ adoption and the 
subsequent use of CEO incentive contracts by firms in the vicinity.  
 
In contrast, early privatisation, as indicated by the rate of decline in the proportion of 
provincial employment accounted for by SOE’s, is strongly positively associated with firm 
use of CEO incentive contracts in all four models. The effect is large. The coefficient is 0.52 
without controls and 0.53 with controls, and is very precisely estimated. This means that a 10 
per cent increase (fall) in the share of employment in the non-state sector over the period 
translates into a 5 per cent increase (fall) in the probability that a firm in that city will use 
incentive contracts for its CEO.  
 
Models (2) and (4) incorporate the percentage of other firms in the city using CEO incentive 
contracts in 2005. This is strongly positively associated with individual firms’ use of CEO 
incentive contracts. The effect is large. Model (4) indicates that a 10 per cent increase in the 
percentage of firms using incentive contracts in a city increases the probability that a firm 
will use a CEO incentive contract by about 6 per cent. This finding is consistent with the 
technology transfer hypothesis discussed earlier, but could also be due to co-location by firms 
according to whether or not they use CEO incentive contracts. However, both the SEZ and 
privatisation coefficients drop markedly with the introduction of the mean use of incentive 
contracts in the city (compare Models (1) and (2) and Models (3) and (4)). This lends 
credence to the suggestion that the mechanism linking these policy experiments to the use of 
CEO incentive contracts by individual firms in 2005 is the promotion of CEO incentive 
contracts among other firms in the city. 
                                                 
11
 Full versions of all the models discussed are available from the authors on request. 
12
 If we replace the SEZ start date dummy with a continuous variable based on Wang's data identifying the date 
of SEZ start up the coefficient is positive and statistically significant in Models (1), (2) and (3), confirming that 
early SEZ set-up is positively correlated with the use of CEO incentive contracts. The coefficient in Model (3) is 
more precisely estimated than the coefficient reported in the table (0.005, t=2.77). However, the coefficient 
becomes statistically non-significant (0.001, t-stat=1.40) in Model (4) when the percentage of other firms in the 
city using CEO incentive contracts is introduced. 
13
 The coefficients and t-statistics for the national endorsement of a city SEZ prior to 1992 are -0.035 (t-
stat=2.22) in Model (3) and -0.010 (t-stat=1.40). 
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Table 4 shows the association between individual firm use of CEO incentive contracts in 
2005 and the two policy variables having conditioned on both firm-level and city-level 
controls as described in equation 2. Early SEZ start-up in the city has no statistically 
significant effect on the use of CEO incentive contracts, suggesting early exposure to FDI did 
not influence firms’ decisions regarding the use of CEO incentives.14 This does not mean 
foreign ownership played no role in firms’ decisions as to whether to adopt CEO incentive 
contracts. On the contrary, foreign ownership is a significant factor in determining whether a 
firm uses CEO incentive contracts. There is a statistically significant negative association 
between foreign ownership of a firm and its use of CEO incentive contracts.
15
  The likelihood 
that a firm uses CEO incentive contracts is lower among firms located in cities with a higher 
proportion of foreign firms in 2005, independently of the firm’s own foreign ownership 
status. Furthermore, the association is wholly accounted for by city-level usage of CEO 
incentive contracts by firms other than the respondent.
16
 But these effects appear to be 
independent of the early introduction of a city SEZ. Setting up an SEZ prior to 1992 is 
positively associated with a higher percentage of foreign-owned firms in a city in 2005.
17
 If 
early SEZ adoption is causally linked to higher foreign ownership in 2005 our inclusion of 
2005 ownership status at city-level may partially account for any SEZ effect. This proves not 
to be the case since the SEZ early adoption dummy variable remains statistically non-
significant in Model (4) if one excludes city-level and firm-level ownership status in 2005.  
 
Large-scale privatisation in the province to which the city belongs is positively associated 
with the use of CEO incentive contracts. The coefficient of 0.46 in Model (1) is almost as 
large as the coefficient of 0.53 in Model (3) in Table 3 and, as in Table 3, the coefficient 
drops to around 0.2 once we condition on the proportion of other firms in the city using CEO 
incentive contracts. This is consistent with the proposition that privatisation resulted in the 
diffusion of CEO contracts within cities and that, once one accounts for this dispersion, much 
of the privatisation effect is removed.
18
 
 
Why should it be that firms located in cities with a higher concentration of foreign owned 
firms are less likely to use incentive contracts to reward their CEO's than observationally 
equivalent firms in cities with a lower penetration of foreign-ownership? One possibility is 
that foreign-owned firms prefer to use efficiency wages to incentivise their CEO's, effectively 
out-bidding domestic rivals for the best executive talent by paying above market rates. Our 
data do not contain information on levels of compensation for CEO's so we are unable to test 
this proposition directly. However, we do have information on average wages of permanent 
workers in firms and the proportion of their pay that is fixed, and the proportion that consists 
of bonuses. How firms compensate their permanent staff may give us some insights into their 
approach to executive compensation. We therefore ran models using the standard controls but 
                                                 
14
 This result is confirmed when we replace our SEZ start-up variable with Wang's. 
15
 Thus in Models (1) and (2) of Table 4 majority foreign owned firms are about 20 per cent less likely to use 
CEO incentive contracts than their private domestically owned counterparts. The raw correlation in the absence 
of other controls is -0.245 (t-stat=5.37). 
16
 The coefficient for the proportion of foreign-owned firms in the city (other than the respondent) is -0.265 (t-
stat=3.79) in Model (3) but it becomes positive and statistically non-significant (0.016, t-stat=0.41) with the 
introduction of the mean city usage of CEO incentive contracts in Model (4). 
17
 The raw correlation is 0.136 (t-stat=3.52). 
18
 Firms that were majority state-owned in 2005 were significantly more likely to use CEO incentive contracts 
than other firms. The raw correlation is 0.051 (t-stat=3.12).  However, the effect becomes statistically non-
significant relative to privately owned domestic firms once one controls for other firm-level factors. The raw 
correlation between city-level state ownership and CEO incentive contract usage is not significant (0.11, t-
stat=1.16). 
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replaced our dependent variable on the use of CEO incentive contracts with the average pay 
of permanent employees. We find that, conditioning on other factors, foreign firms pay 
significantly more than other firms. Furthermore, conditioning on foreign ownership and all 
other controls, the level of pay a firm sets for its permanent employees is positively and 
significantly associated with the mean percentage of foreign owned firms in the city. In a 
regression estimating average wages of permanent workers in 2004 yuan, the coefficient on 
mean share of foreign owned firms in the city (excluding the firm respondent)  was 793.34 (t-
statistic=3.49). The share of foreign owned firms in the city is also associated with a higher 
percentage of permanent employees' compensation being made up of fixed salary rather than 
bonuses and other performance-based pay. In a regression estimating the percentage of 
permanent worker compensation paid via a fixed salary, the coefficient on mean share of 
foreign owned firms in the city (excluding the firm respondent) was 10.80 (t-stat=3.27). This 
evidence, albeit for permanent workers rather than executives, suggests foreign owned firms 
exert a negative influence over firms' propensity to use incentive contracts, preferring instead 
to pay their workers in excess of the market wage in the locality. This makes sense if foreign 
firms are attracted by efficiency wages, for example, or if there are administrative or other 
impediments to adopting the incentive-type structures favoured by domestic firms. 
 
Finally we turn to city-level estimates of CEO incentive contracts in the 120 cities covered by 
the World Bank Survey 2005. The estimates presented in Table 5 are based on the two-stage 
procedure outlined earlier in Equations 3.1 and 3.2. The dependent variable is the city fixed 
effects coefficients from a first stage estimate of firms’ probability of using a CEO incentive 
contract having controlled for CEO and firm-level characteristics. In the absence of controls, 
cities adopting SEZ’s early on had fewer firms using CEO incentive contracts in 2005. 
However, the correlation in Model (1) is only on the margins of statistical significance and 
becomes almost zero and non-significant once city-level controls are added in Model (2). On 
the other hand, cities embarking on large-scale privatisation had a significantly higher 
percentage of firms using CEO incentive contracts in 2005, the coefficients being of a similar 
magnitude to those presented in the firm-level analyses.
19
 Results are similar when we 
bootstrap the standard errors, although the privatisation coefficient is less precisely estimated 
in Model (4) which conditions on city-level controls.
20
 
 
 
6. Discussion and Conclusion 
 
Although China is now the second largest economy in the world, all we know about 
executive compensation comes from studies of public listed companies and state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs). This paper is the first to examine incentive contracts for CEO's across all 
industrial sectors of the economy. We do so using World Bank enterprise data for 2005. We 
show that incentive contracts are commonplace but that their incidence varies significantly 
across Chinese cities. This is unsurprising given the role of sub-national governments, 
including cities and provinces, in experimenting with market-oriented reforms. We test two 
hypotheses to explain the pattern of incentives across China's cities. The first considers the 
rate at which SOE's were privatised. We find CEO incentive contracts are positively 
correlated with the speed with which cities privatised their SOEs. The literature clearly 
indicates that SOE's were among the first firms in China to use incentive contracts for 
                                                 
19
 The results are nearly identical if one runs the analyses at firm-level and introduces the city fixed effects 
alongside the firm-level controls and two policy variables. 
20
 Again, our SEZ results are replicated when using Wang's data for SEZ start up date. 
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executives. They did so in the expectation that, together with other reforms, this would result 
in improvements in their productivity and financial performance. These expectations were 
well-founded. Subsequently, regional governments began to privatise the SOEs they 
controlled, beginning with the better performing SOE's. Many of these privatisations took the 
form of management buy-outs, so that some of the CEO's on incentive contracts were simply 
shifted to the private sector. However, it appears other domestically-owned firms followed 
the initiative taken by these first movers in much the same way as the technology diffusion 
literature might have predicted. 
 
We also considered a second major reform undertaken at regional and city level, namely the 
introduction of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) which sought to attract FDI. The literature 
clearly indicates that they were very successful in doing so. Theoretically, their impact on 
firms' use of incentive contracts for CEO's is indeterminate. Our empirical analysis reveals 
that the early introduction of FDI and export-oriented firms via SEZ's is weakly associated 
with lowering firms' probabilities of using incentive contracts for CEO's. The association 
disappears having controlled for other firm and city-level characteristics. 
 
Although early exposure to FDI through the introduction of SEZs does not appear to have 
influenced firms’ choice of incentive contracts, city concentrations of foreign ownership 
nevertheless have a negative impact on the use of CEO incentive contracts, in spite of the fact 
that many foreign-based firms would have used such contracts in their operations elsewhere 
in the world. Using data on the compensation of permanent employees we find foreign 
ownership, both at firm and city level, is associated with higher levels of compensation and 
an increased likelihood of paying a fixed salary as opposed to incentive and bonus-based 
contracts. Paying above-market wages can be seen as an alternative to the use of incentive 
contracts to recruit, retain and motivate employees. Although we do not have the data on 
CEO compensation levels, it is quite possible that foreign ownership leads to higher-than-
average CEO compensation levels as a substitute for the use of bonus-based payments. 
 
 
 13 
References 
 
Bloom, N. and Van Reenen, J. (2011) "Human resource management and productivity",  In 
Handbook of Labor Economics vol. 4B (eds O. Ashenfelter and D. Card), pp. 1697-
1767. Amsterdam: Elsevier. 
 
Bryson, A., Forth, J. and Zhou, M. (2012a) "The CEO Labour Market in China's Public 
Listed Companies", NIESR Discussion Paper No. 391. 
 
Bryson, A., Forth, J. and Zhou, M. (2012b) "What Do We Know About China's CEO’s? 
Evidence from Across the Whole Economy", NIESR Discussion Paper No. 397. 
 
Bryson, A. Gomez, R.., Kretschmer, T. and Willman, P. (2007) "The Diffusion of Workplace 
Voice and High-Commitment Human Resource Management Practices in Britain, 
1984-1998", Industrial and Corporate Change, 16, 3: 395-426. 
 
Cao, J., Lemmon, M., Pan, X., Qian, M. and Tian, G. (2012) "Political Promotion, CEO 
Incentives, and the Relationship between Pay and Performance", mimeo. 
 
Caves, R. (1996) Multinational Enterprise and Economic Analysis, Second Edition. New 
York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
DiMaggio, P. J. and Powell, W. (1983) "The iron cage revisited: institutional isomorphism 
and collective rationality in organisational fields", American Sociological Review, 48 
(1983), 147-60. 
 
Gan, J., Guo, Y. and Xu, C. (2010) "Privatisation and the Change of Control Rights: The 
Case of China", Peking University School of Economics Working Paper E-2010-06-
006. 
 
Gibbons, S. and Overman, H. G. (2012) "Mostly Pointless Spatial Econometrics?" Journal of 
Regional Science, Vol. 52(2), 172-191. 
 
Groves, T., Hong, Y., McMillan, J., and Naughton, B. (1994) "Autonomy and Incentives in 
Chinese State Enterprises", The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109, 1: 183-209. 
 
Groves, T., Hong, Y., McMillan, J., and Naughton, B. (1995) "China's Evolving Managerial 
Labor Market", Journal of Political Economy, 103, 4: 873-892. 
 
Holmström, B. and P. Milgrom (1991). "Multi-task principal-agent analyses: Incentive 
contracts, asset ownership, and job design", Journal of Law, Economics, and 
Organisation 7, 24-52. 
 
Ichniowski, C. and K. Shaw (1995), "Old dogs and new tricks: determinants of the adoption 
of productivity-enhancing work practices",  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: 
Microeconomics,  Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, pp. 1–65. 
 
Jefferson, G.H., Hu, A.G.Z., and Su, J. (2006). “The sources and sustainability of China's 
economic growth”Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2, 1-60, Brookings 
Institution, Washington, DC. 
 14 
 
Te Velde, D. (2003) "Foreign Ownership, Microelectronic Technology and Skills: Evidence 
from British Establishments", National Institute Economic Review, 185: 93-106. 
 
Wang, J. (2013) "The economic impact of Special Economic Zones: Evidence from Chinese 
municipalities", Journal of Development Economics, 101: 133-147. 
 
Xu, C. (2011) "The Fundamental Institutions of China's Reforms and Development", Journal 
of Economic Literature, 49, 4: 1076-1151. 
 
Zhou M., Xiao W. and Yao X. (2010) “Firm Heterogeneity, Ownership Structure and Labour 
Income Share,” Management World, 10, 24-33. 
 
 
  
15 
 
Table 1: Firm Ownership In China, 2005 
 Ownership status: Any Majority Owner 
State: 19 13 
Collective: 13 8 
Corporation: 37 26 
Private: 51 36 
Foreign: 21 14 
None - 3 
 
Note: authors' calculations from the World Bank Investment Climate Survey 2005. N=12,400. Respondents 
asked "What percentage of your firm is owned by...." Figures in column 1 are cell percentages; figures in 
columns 2 and 3 are column percentages.  
 
 
Table 2: Performance Pay Among CEO's In China, 2005 
Majority ownership status: Any 
Low 
Powered 
High 
Powered 
State 71 47 23 
Collective 64 47 17 
Corporation 73 47 25 
Private 67 43 23 
Foreign 48 31 17 
No majority owner 71 44 26 
All 67 44 23 
 
Note: authors' calculations from the World Bank Investment Climate Survey 2005. Figures are cell percentages. 
Respondents were asked "Is the CEO's annual income directly related to the company's performance?" 
Unweighted N=12,242. Follow up questions ask how CEO's income increases/decreases if company 
performance exceeds/fails the target with 7 categorical responses recording the percentage change running from 
1-5% to >61%. "Low powered" identifies incentive contracts with <11% income at stake. "High powered" 
identifies incentive contracts with 11% or more income at stake. Columns 2 and 3 based on unweighted 
N=11,938. Rounding means row percentages in columns 2 and 3 don't always equal the cell percentage in 
column 1. 
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Table 3: Association Between CEO Incentive Contracts, SEZ Introduction and 
Privatisation, With and Without Firm-level Controls 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
SEZ set up in city before 1992: 
 -0.044 
(1.95) 
-0.009 
(1.54) 
-0.033 
(1.89) 
-0.011 
(1.59) 
Change in provincial employment in SOE’s 1978-2005: 
 0.522 
(4.08)** 
0.108 
(2.99)** 
0.529 
(4.56)** 
0.207 
(3.41)** 
% other firms in city using incentive contracts: 
  0.788 
(27.02)** 
 0.605 
(13.36)** 
Constant 0.429 
(6.81)** 
0.094 
(5.36)** 
0.029 
(0.43) 
-0.213 
(4.55)** 
Controls No No Yes Yes 
Observations 11817 11817 11817 11817 
Adj. R-squared 0.01 0.03 0.07 0.08 
 
Note: 
(1) Linear estimation of firm use of incentive contracts. 
(2) t-statistics in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at city level. * Statistically significant at 95% CI; ** 
statistically significant at 99% CI. 
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Table 4: Association Between CEO Incentive Contracts, SEZ Introduction and 
Privatisation, With and Without Controls at Firm and City Level 
 (1) (2) 
SEZ set up in city before 1992: 
 -0.014 
(0.78) 
-0.006 
(0.71) 
Change in provincial employment in SOE’s 1978-2005: 
 0.459 
(3.31)** 
0.217 
(3.32)** 
% other firms in city using incentive contracts: 
  0.574 
(10.48)** 
Constant -0.149 
(0.42) 
-0.058 
(0.36) 
Controls: Yes Yes 
Observations 11817 11817 
Adjusted R-squared 0.08 0.09 
 
Note: 
(1) Linear estimation of firm use of incentive contracts. 
(2) t-statistics in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at city level. * Statistically significant at 95% CI; ** 
statistically significant at 99% CI. 
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Table 5: Association Between CEO Incentive Contracts, SEZ Introduction and 
Privatisation, City-level Estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
SEZ set up in city before 1992: 
 -0.038 
(1.94) 
0.001 
(0.03) 
-0.038 
(1.73) 
0.001 
(0.02) 
Change in provincial employment in SOE’s 1978-2005: 
 0.533 
(4.42)** 
0.320 
(2.02)* 
0.533 
(5.54)** 
0.320 
(1.29) 
Constant -0.247 
(4.28)** 
0.012 
(0.02) 
-0.247 
(5.31) 
0.012 
(0.02) 
Controls: No Yes No Yes 
Observations 120 120 120 120 
Adjusted R-squared 0.14 0.35 0.14 0.35 
 
Note: 
(1) Second stage from two-stage linear estimation. First stage recovers city fixed effects from linear estimation 
of firm use of incentive contracts as per Equation 3.1. This table regresses the city fixed effects recovered from 
the first stage on city-level mean aggregates of the controls discussed in the text as per Equation 3.2. Models (3) 
and (4) are identical to models (1) and (2) but bootstrap standard errors using 50 replications. 
(2) t-statistics in parentheses. * Statistically significant at 95% CI; ** statistically significant at 99% CI. 
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Data Appendix 
 
We use data from the 2005 World Bank Investment Climate Survey undertaken by the 
National Bureau of Statistics in China (www.enterprisesurveys.org) which is described in 
Section Four. Descriptive information on these variables in presented in Appendix Table A1. 
We link information on privatisation and the introduction of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) 
to the World Bank data by matching information from external sources to the city and 
province identifiers in the World Bank data. These data are presented in Appendix Table A2.  
 
Columns 3 and 4 of Table A2 contain the employment share of SOE's by province in 1978 
and 2005 respectively. Using data from the Chinese Statistical Yearbook for 1978-2008 we 
calculate the share as the number of employed persons in the state-owned sector divided by 
the total number of employed persons in urban units  at year-end by status of registration.  
 
Columns 5-7 identify the year in which cities and provinces established Special Economic 
Zones (SEZs), also sometimes referred to as Development Zones. Column 5 identifies the 
year in which city level SEZ's were established; column 6 identifies the year in which 
provincial SEZ's were acknowledged; and the final column identifies the year that national 
SEZ's were acknowledged. Where the three dates are identical this indicates that the SEZ was 
an experiment initiated by the central state. Where the national SEZ date is later than or equal 
to the date for the provincial SEZ and the date for the city SEZ predates that for the 
provincial SEZ this indicates a local city-level experiment that subsequently gained national 
recognition. Where the date for a national SEZ is absent but there is evidence of a city or 
provincial SEZ this means the local SEZ initiative has yet to be sanctioned by the central 
state. Finally, there are two cities with no date for the establishment of a SEZ; this indicates 
there is no SEZ in that city in the period through to 2010. These dates are obtained from 
various web resources including the website for China Development Zones at 
http://www.cadz.org.cn/en/index.jsp?ItemID=1650. 
 
An English website of the listing of the development zones can be found at 
http://www.cadz.org.cn/en/etdz.jsp?ItemID=558. 
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Appendix Table A1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
Mi
n 
Max 
      
Whether CEO Pay Linked to Firm Performance 11817 0.669  0.470  0 1 
      
Corporate governance:      
Type of Board of Directors (BOD): No BOD 11817 0.279  0.449  0 1 
   BOD with CEO/Chair separation 11817 0.357  0.479  0 1 
   BOD with CEO/Chair duality 11817 0.364  0.481  0 1 
Fire or demotion of CEO, last 4 years 11817 0.222  0.416  0 1 
Ratio of CEO wage to middle managers' 
(categorical) 
11817 2.166  1.240  1 5 
 
CEO characteristics: 
     
CEO tenure (years) 11817 6.399  4.721  1 56 
Education of CEO (categorical) 11817 5.575  0.994  1 7 
CEO appointed by government 11817 0.119  0.324  0 1 
Production autonomy of CEO 11817 7.410  1.490  1 8 
Investment autonomy of CEO 11817 6.868  2.054  1 8 
Employment autonomy of CEO (categorical) 11817 7.305  1.587  1 8 
 
Firm characteristics: 
     
Majority ownership: State 11817 0.131  0.337  0 1 
   Collective 11817 0.082  0.275  0 1 
   Legal persons 11817 0.259  0.438  0 1 
   Private 11817 0.367  0.482  0 1 
   Foreign 11817 0.130  0.337  0 1 
   No majority ownership 11817 0.031  0.174  0 1 
Size (Log of employees) 11817 5.619  1.473  1.8  13.5  
Age (Log of years) 11817 2.277  0.786  1.1  4.9  
Coefficient of variation in sales, last 3 years 11817 0.324  0.251  0 1.7  
Number of power outages annually 11817 
11.39
7  
23.903  0 400 
Average wage for permanent workers 2004-02 
(yuan) 
11817 
1011.
4 
684.3 0.4 13247 
Average wage for permanent workers 2004 (yuan) 11817 
1097.
1 
768.9 0.4 13653 
Average working hours per week (categorical) 11816 3.35 1.53 1 6 
% permanent worker compensation in fixed salary 11573 46.97 34.97 0 100 
% permanent worker compensation in bonus 11573 12.92 17.26 0 100 
Industry: Petroleum 11817 0.014  0.119  0 1 
   AgProcess 11817 0.079  0.269  0 1 
   BlackMetal 11817 0.040  0.196  0 1 
   ChemFiber 11817 0.004  0.063  0 1 
   ChemMat 11817 0.116  0.321  0 1 
   ClothShoeHat 11817 0.017  0.127  0 1 
   ColorMetal 11817 0.028  0.164  0 1 
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Appendix Table A1 continued 
Variable Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
   CommunicateEquip 11817 0.046  0.210  0 1 
   Craft   11817 0.009  0.093  0 1 
   DrinkManufacture 11817 0.014  0.117  0 1 
   EduSportGood 11817 0.003  0.057  0 1 
   Electronics 11817 0.069  0.254  0 1 
   FoodManufacture 11817 0.020  0.140  0 1 
   Furniture 11817 0.004  0.067  0 1 
   GeneralEquip 11817 0.087  0.282  0 1 
   Instruments 11817 0.005  0.069  0 1 
   Leather 11817 0.012  0.107  0 1 
   Medical Equip 11817 0.034  0.182  0 1 
   Metal   11817 0.030  0.170  0 1 
   NonMetal 11817 0.105  0.306  0 1 
   Paper   11817 0.019  0.137  0 1 
   Plastic 11817 0.027  0.163  0 1 
   Printing 11817 0.005  0.069  0 1 
   Recycle 11817 0.000  0.016  0 1 
   Rubber  11817 0.002  0.040  0 1 
   SpecificEquip 11817 0.040  0.196  0 1 
   Textile 11817 0.077  0.267  0 1 
   Tobacco 11817 0.003  0.059  0 1 
   TransEquip 11817 0.079  0.270  0 1 
   WoodProcessing 11817 0.011  0.105  0 1 
Main City and Provincial Characteristics: 
Means for other firms in city: 
  CEO incentive contracts 
  Foreign owned 
  State-owned 
 
 
11817 
11817 
11817 
 
 
0.668 
0.128 
0.129 
 
 
0.106 
0.166  
0.090 
 
 
0.40 
0  
0 
 
 
0.90 
0.81  
0.36 
Start date for city SEZ  before 1992 11817 0.225 0.419 0 1 
Change in SOE share of provincial employment, 
78-05 
11817 0.478 0.068 0.29 0.60 
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Appendix Table A2: City and Provincial Indexes of Marketisation  
Province City 
Employment Share of 
SOE, 1978 
Employment Share 
of SOE, 2005 SEZ, city SEZ, province SEZ, national 
Anhui Anqing 0.74 0.27 1992 1993 2010 
Anhui Chuzhou 0.74 0.27 1992 1992 2010 
Anhui Hefei 0.74 0.27 1993 1993 2000 
Anhui Wuhu 0.74 0.27 1993 1993 1993 
Beijing Beijing 0.83 0.26 1994 1994 1994 
Chongqing Chongqing 0.69 0.19 1993 1993 1993 
Fujian Fuzhou 0.72 0.26 1986 1986 1986 
Fujian Quanzhou 0.72 0.26 1996 1996 2010 
Fujian Sanming 0.72 0.26 2009 2010 
 
Fujian Xiamen 0.72 0.26 1981 1981 1981 
Fujian Zhangzhou 0.72 0.26 1992 1992 2010 
Gansu Lanzhou 0.90 0.42 1993 1993 2002 
Gansu Tianshui 0.90 0.42 1994 1994 2009 
Guangdong Dongguan 0.71 0.20 2003 2006 
 
Guangdong Foshan 0.71 0.20 2003 2006 
 
Guangdong Guangzhou 0.71 0.20 1984 1984 1984 
Guangdong Huizhou 0.71 0.20 1993 1993 1993 
Guangdong Jiangmen 0.71 0.20 1991 1991 
 
Guangdong Maoming 0.71 0.20 1992 1992 
 
Guangdong Shantou 0.71 0.20 1981 1981 1981 
Guangdong Shenzhen 0.71 0.20 1980 1980 1980 
Guangdong Zhuhai 0.71 0.20 1980 1980 1980 
Guangxi Guilin 0.84 0.24 1992 1994 
 
Guangxi Liuzhou 0.84 0.24 1992 1992 
 
Guangxi Nanning 0.84 0.24 1992 1992 2001 
Guizhou Guiyang 0.80 0.32 1993 1993 2000 
Guizhou Zunyi 0.80 0.32 1992 1992 2010 
Hainan Haikou 0.90 0.46 1988 1988 1988 
Hebei Baoding 0.83 0.45 2000 2006 
 
Hebei Cangzhou 0.83 0.45 2003 2003 2010 
Hebei Handan 0.83 0.45 1992 1992 
 
Hebei Langfang 0.83 0.45 1992 1992 2009 
Hebei Qinhuangdao 0.83 0.45 1984 1984 1984 
Hebei Shijiazhuang 0.83 0.45 1992 1992 
 
Hebei Tangshan 0.83 0.45 1992 1992 2010 
Hebei Zhangjiakou 0.83 0.45 1992 2006 
 
Heilongjiang Daqing 0.79 0.36 2006 2006 
 
Heilongjiang Harbin 0.79 0.36 1993 1993 1993 
Heilongjiang Qiqihar 0.79 0.36 
   
Henan Luoyang 0.82 0.43 1992 1994 
 
Henan Nanyang 0.82 0.43 
   
Henan Shangqiu 0.82 0.43 1995 1995 
 
Henan Xinxiang 0.82 0.43 1992 1994 
 
Henan Xuchang 0.82 0.43 1994 1994 2000 
Henan Zhengzhou 0.82 0.43 1993 1993 2000 
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Henan Zhoukou 0.82 0.43 1997 1997 
 
Hubei Huanggang 0.81 0.24 1992 1992 2010 
Hubei Jingmen 0.81 0.24 2000 2000 
 
Hubei Jingzhou 0.81 0.24 1992 1992 2011 
Hubei Wuhan 0.77 0.29 1991 1991 1993 
Hubei Xiangfan 0.81 0.24 1992 1992 1992 
Hubei Xiaogan 0.81 0.24 1997 1997 
 
Hubei Yichang 0.81 0.24 1988 1992 2010 
Hunan Changde 0.77 0.29 1992 1994 
 
Hunan Changsha 0.77 0.29 1992 1992 2000 
Hunan Hengyang 0.77 0.29 1992 1994 
 
Hunan Yueyang 0.77 0.29 1992 1992 2000 
Hunan Zhuzhou 0.77 0.29 1992 1992 1992 
Jiangsu Changzhou 0.63 0.13 1992 1992 1992 
Jiangsu Lianyungang 0.63 0.13 1984 1984 1984 
Jiangsu Nanjing 0.63 0.13 1988 1988 1991 
Jiangsu Nantong 0.63 0.13 1984 1984 1984 
Jiangsu Suzhou 0.63 0.13 1992 1992 1992 
Jiangsu Wuxi 0.63 0.13 1992 1992 1992 
Jiangsu Xuzhou 0.63 0.13 1992 1992 
 
Jiangsu Yancheng 0.63 0.13 1992 1993 2010 
Jiangsu Yangzhou 0.63 0.13 1992 1992 2009 
Jiangxi Ganzhou 0.82 0.30 2004 2004 2010 
Jiangxi Jiujiang 0.82 0.30 1992 1992 2010 
Jiangxi Nanchang 0.82 0.30 1991 1991 1991 
Jiangxi Shangrao 0.82 0.30 2001 2001 2010 
Jiangxi Yichun 0.82 0.30 2003 2006 
 
Jilin Changchun 0.77 0.32 1993 1993 1993 
Jilin Jilin 0.77 0.32 1992 1992 1992 
Liaoning Anshan 0.76 0.29 1991 1991 1992 
Liaoning Benxi 0.76 0.29 1993 1993 
 
Liaoning Dalian 0.76 0.29 1984 1984 1984 
Liaoning Fushun 0.76 0.29 1992 1993 
 
Liaoning Jinzhou 0.76 0.29 1992 1992 2010 
Liaoning Shenyang 0.76 0.29 1993 1993 1993 
Nei Mongol Baotou 0.80 0.46 1992 1992 1992 
Nei Mongol Hohhot 0.80 0.46 1992 1995 2000 
Ningxia Hui Wuzhong 0.88 0.43 2006 2006 
 
Ningxia Hui Yinchuan 0.88 0.43 1992 1992 2001 
Qinghai Xining 0.89 0.31 2000 2000 2000 
Shaanxi Baoji 0.86 0.45 1992 1992 1992 
Shaanxi Xi'an 0.86 0.45 1993 1993 2000 
Shaanxi Xianyang 0.86 0.45 1992 1992 
 
Shandong Binzhou 0.75 0.18 2010 2010 
 
Shandong Jinan 0.75 0.18 1988 1990 1991 
Shandong Jining 0.75 0.18 1992 1992 2010 
Shandong Linyi 0.75 0.18 2003 2003 2010 
Shandong Qingdao 0.75 0.18 1984 1984 1984 
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Shandong Tai'an 0.75 0.18 2000 2000 
 
Shandong Weifang 0.75 0.18 1992 1992 1992 
Shandong Weihai 0.75 0.18 1991 1991 1991 
Shandong Yantai 0.75 0.18 1984 1984 1984 
Shandong Zibo 0.75 0.18 1992 1992 1992 
Shanghai Shanghai 0.79 0.20 1986 1986 1986 
Shanxi Datong 0.85 0.56 1992 1992 2010 
Shanxi Taiyuan 0.85 0.56 1991 1991 1992 
Shanxi Yuncheng 0.85 0.56 1992 1992 
 
Sichuan Chengdu 0.75 0.23 1991 1991 1991 
Sichuan Deyang 0.75 0.23 1992 1992 2010 
Sichuan Leshan 0.75 0.23 1992 2002 
 
Sichuan Mianyang 0.75 0.23 1992 1992 1992 
Sichuan Yibin 0.75 0.23 1992 1992 
 
Tianjin Tianjin 0.77 0.28 1984 1984 1984 
Xinjiang Uygur Wulumuqi 0.77 0.28 1994 1994 1994 
Yunnan Kunming 0.88 0.41 1992 1992 1992 
Yunnan Qujing 0.88 0.41 1992 1992 2010 
Yunnan Yuxi 0.88 0.41 1998 1998 
 
Zhejiang Hangzhou 0.58 0.13 1990 1991 1991 
Zhejiang Huzhou 0.58 0.13 1992 1992 2010 
Zhejiang Jiaxing 0.58 0.13 1992 1992 2010 
Zhejiang Jinhua 0.58 0.13 1992 1993 2010 
Zhejiang Ningbo 0.58 0.13 1984 1984 1984 
Zhejiang Shaoxing 0.58 0.13 2000 2000 2010 
Zhejiang Taizhou 0.58 0.13 1997 1997 
 
Zhejiang Wenzhou 0.58 0.13 1992 1992 1992 
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Figure  1: City Effects on CEO Incentive Contracts, No Controls 
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Figure 2: City Effects on CEO Incentive Contracts, With Controls 
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